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Abstract 
This article aims to understand the recent heightened levels of mobilization and 
unconventional political participation in Turkey. We use a political psychology 
model that highlights the impact of civic engagement, political sophistication, 
and values on conventional and unconventional participation. We argue that 
these factors will be significant predictors of unconventional participation 
setting it apart from conventional political behavior, which will be driven by 
simpler considerations. We expect these qualitative differences in the drivers of 
conventional and unconventional participation to go beyond age and gender 
differences and highlight the complexity of political decision making in Turkey’s 
electoral authoritarian system.  We use the 2012 World Value Survey to test our 
hypotheses, with a nationally representative sample of Turkish citizens. We find 
significant variations in the role of values, sophistication, and levels of civic 
engagement for conventional and unconventional participation when controlling 
for age, gender, and left-right ideological orientations. Our findings confirm the 
complex considerations that drive citizens’ engagement with politics and can be 
useful to explaining recent political developments in Turkey involving youth, 
public mobilization and protests, but also mainstream voting choices.  
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Introduction  
Our article seeks to understand the psychological determinants that underlie 
recent spikes in unconventional political participation in Turkey. In 2013, 
citizens gathered in Gezi park as well as the country’s big cities and abroad to 
demonstrate in support of individual freedoms and rights against government 
repression. Extant research shows that participants in Gezi came from diverse 
backgrounds and political orientations1 (Chrona and Bee forthcoming; Acar and 
Uluğ 2016; Damar 2016). The Gezi events were marked by high levels of youth 
participation in street protests between May and July 2013, which come in sharp 
contrast with the low levels of political participation traditionally reported for 
the country (Bozkurt et al. 2015; Cankurtaran and Hatiboğlu 2013). As Göle puts 
it ‘The Gezi Park Movement […] provided a home for democratic imaginaries 
growing and resonating from Istanbul, Turkey. [….] The Gezi movement marked 
a new threshold for democracy…’ (2013, 7-8).  
Three years later, and at the aftermath of the coup d’état attempt on 15 
July 2016, tens of thousands of citizens came to the streets again, to express 
opposition to the military’s intervention in public life, support democracy and 
promote public sovereignty.  On 24 July 2016 mass cross-party mobilizations at 
the center of Istanbul in Taksim square, brought together individuals from a 
variety of political camps (BBC, 24 June 2016). Initially, these were opponents of 
the government celebrating democracy and the secular-republican state; and 
they were joined by those in support of the government and president Erdogan’s 
actions that led to the failure of the coup. These two groups joined forces sharing 
their opposition to the military coup that they saw as a danger to the country’s 
freedom and democracy. Following up on 7 August 2016, a massive public rally 
in Istanbul united over a million people from diverse political camps, marching 
against the failed coup and advocating the democratic settlement of the country 
against any intervention (CNN, 8 August 2016).  
 Our research investigates the psychological mechanisms that bind these 
diverse groups of people together and inspire unconventional political 
participation as we saw in the case of Gezi movement or the protests against the 
military coup2. We also seek to examine what sets those individuals apart from 
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those more likely to engage in conventional participation acts. We draw insights 
from studies that highlight the role of sophistication and values to understand 
variation in political participation (Inglehart 1977, 1990; Capelos and Chrona 
2012; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu 2007; Kentmen-Çin 2007; Özbudun 1977). Our 
study engages in an empirical investigation of unconventional participation 
alongside its conventional expressions to see whether they are guided by similar 
principles.  
 Turkey’s culture and political system provide a timely test for our 
political psychological models of participation and engagement. Turkey is 
recently characterised as an electoral authoritarianism regime, with the 
antithetical elements of electoral processes and increasing authoritarianism 
coexisting in the socio-political environment (Esen and Gumuscu 2016; Arbatli 
2014; Herzog 2015; Karakatsanis 2016; Iğsız 2014). These, shape a complex 
political mosaic within which public expression originates and develops. Voting 
in national elections has been mandatory since 1982, and electoral turnout is 
high3  (Croucher et al. 2013; International IDEA 2016). At the same time Turkey’s 
ratings on freedom and civil liberties has worsened since 2013 (Freedom House) 
with citizens witnessing a number of powerful state-led repressive tactics, civil 
liberties and political rights restrictions, and personal integrity violations 
(Amnesty International 2013; Abbas and Yiğit 2015). In this context, it is 
important to investigate the determinants of participation, keeping two 
considerations in mind: a) is the Turkish political environment with its electoral 
authoritarian characteristics determining a different kind of engagement with 
conventional and unconventional participation compared to western 
democracies, and b) are there systematic differences in the predictors of 
conventional and unconventional participation in this context. Traditionally, 
those engaging in non-conventional political behaviors are the young. Below we 
explain why we expect unconventional political engagement to be driven by 
more complex psychological considerations than traditional participation 
channels. We test this hypothesis by using nationally representative data from 
the 6th wave of World Value Survey (WVS) conducted in Turkey in 2012.4. We 
find that focusing on citizens’ values, levels of sophistication and records of civic 
engagement provides us with valuable insights about their participation 
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preferences.   
 Unlocking the black box of conventional and unconventional political 
participation in Turkey is timely and important. The recently witnessed public 
mobilizations are not easy to understand unless we consider the qualitative 
differences in citizens’ drivers of political engagement. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu 
(2007) found that older individuals tend to engage with conventional 
participation, whereas young individuals prefer to engage with unconventional 
forms of participation. Our study contributes to this discussion in three ways: (1) 
We extend the analysis of unconventional participation beyond age, to account 
for the psychological factors that are significant predictors in western contexts: 
sophistication and value preferences; (2) We draw parallels with mobilization 
phenomena in western democracies, and understand potential differences in the 
Turkish case;(3) The engagement of citizens in political affairs represents a 
central point in the good functioning of democratic systems. Uncovering the 
determinants of conventional and unconventional participation can help us gain 
appreciation for the type of politics citizens aspire to and support in electoral 
authoritarian contexts. 
In the sections that follow, we review the conceptualisation of 
unconventional and conventional political participation, their neighbouring term 
civic engagement, and highlight the role of core values, political sophistication 
and age as their potential determinants. This leads to our hypotheses that 
unconventional participation in Turkey is driven by more complex 
considerations compared to conventional participation. We then present the 
sample design and variable operationalizations of the WVS dataset, and the 
variable scales we use in our study. Our analysis outlines the significant role of 
values, sophistication, and civic engagement above and beyond the effects of age 
for unconventional participation, and a simple model accounting for 
conventional items. In closing, we discuss the significance of our empirical 
findings for understanding political participation in Turkey but also other non-
Western electoral authoritarian contexts. 
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The political psychology of participation:  sophistication, values, and civic 
engagement 
Political participation is one of the necessary conditions for democracy (Verba et 
al. 1995; Norris 2002; Barrett and Zani 2015). By political participation we refer 
to the spectrum of behaviours aiming to influence ‘political institutions, 
processes and decision-making at either the local, regional, national or 
supranational level’ (Barrett and Zani 2015, 4). Following Inglehart (1977) we 
distinguish between conventional and unconventional participation and ask 
whether each has qualitatively different drivers in the context of Turkey.  
Conventional participation maps the spectrum of activities that aim to 
have a socio-political impact through traditional electoral processes such as 
voting (Verba and Nie 1972; Barrett and Smith 2012). Conversely, 
unconventional participation aims to bring change outside the formal electoral 
processes and includes more direct means of participation such as petitioning, 
taking part in demonstrations and the like (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Barrett and 
Smith 2012). This distinction provides a significant differentiation among 
participatory behaviors in terms of directness  and also in terms of the means 
employed, the two modes are not mutually exclusive; an individual can engage 
with both conventional and unconventional means or one of the two (Barnes and 
Kaase 1979; Grasso 2012; Mannarini et al. 2008). In other words, although the 
terms of conventional and unconventional participation refer to different 
modalities of participation, individual engagement with these modalities can 
vary. For instance one can engage with both conventional and unconventional 
channels of participation thinking that the more intense their participation the 
better the outcome in terms of political impact. Equally, an individual may decide 
to engage with only conventional forms of participation, assuming that 
traditional channels, i.e. voting, is the only way that can have an actual and direct 
impact on the social and political life. Alternatively, one may select to abstain 
from conventional channels and engage only with unconventional forms of 
participation as the only way real change can take place against governing 
institutions5. 
 Regardless of how one decides to engage or not with conventional modes 
of participation, existing literature suggests that engagement with 
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unconventional participation in several occasions reflects an expression of 
discontent with conventional forms of participation and disaffection with the 
political environment and  governing institutions (Gurr 1970; Stockemer 2014). 
Gurr (1970) in his seminal study suggested that unconventional acts of 
participation (including both violent and non-violent channels) demonstrate 
discontent with the conventional channels of democratic governance. 
In terms of conventional participation, voting in Turkey has been 
reportedly high6. High levels of electoral participation show that making voting 
mandatory in Turkey was successful. Interestingly as Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu 
point out, unconventional participation is chosen by those segments of the 
population that feel they do not have any other opportunities to make their 
voices heard by the authorities (2007, 103). Looking at the recent events, 
unconventional participation, and in particular public rallies, have been on the 
rise. This brings us to the interesting observation that Turkish citizens 
appreciate both conventional and unconventional means of participation; we 
argue that the individual drivers for each are expected to be different 
 Age is an important variable in analyses of political participation as 
several scholars have been raising attention to young people’s abstention from 
formal political processes (Norris 2011; Henn and Foard 2012). Some studies 
show that young generations have developed a discontent with politics and stay 
alienated from the political processes (Marsh et al.  2007). Other studies argue 
that young people hold an interest in political affairs, believe in democratic 
processes, but engage with alternative and unconventional forms of political 
action (Norris 2003; O’ Toole et al. 2003; Quintelier 2007; Dalton 2009; Phelps 
2012). Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu (2007) find that age is a decisive factor of 
participatory behavior in Turkey. They show that older citizens favor 
conventional participation whereas younger individuals prefer to engage with 
direct means of participation because they perceive conventional means to be 
ineffective in generating change. 
 On the basis of the above, there is ground to expect that older age will be 
associated with conventional participation, and younger age will be associated 
with its unconventional expressions. In addition, we expect participation to be a 
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function of a psychological process of connecting with politics more broadly, 
namely civic engagement, political sophistication, and values.  
 
From civic engagement to participation: what inspires political engagement  
Civic engagement is an individuals’ voluntary engagement ‘with the goals, 
concerns and common good of a [geographical, social and cultural] community’ 
and it takes the form of holding an interest, beliefs, attitudes or feelings towards 
an issue of certain civic or political importance (Barrett and Zani 2015, 4). It is 
often seen as the natural predecessor of political participation and a significant 
determinant for the empowerment of social capital (Ekman and Amnå 2012). 
Civic engagement does not necessarily imply participatory behavior. Having an 
interest in a political matter does not automatically mean that one is willing to 
engage with political action. Also, political participation does not require civic 
engagement. Individuals can participate in political acts they consider important, 
even when they do not have a history of political engagement. Civic engagement 
results from the cognitive or affective engagement one develops towards one or 
more issues, whereas political participation encompasses the passage to 
behavioral engagement that translates into active involvement and participatory 
behaviors (Bee, forthcoming). 
The empirical examination of the relationship between political 
participation and civic engagement in Turkey has been limited. Extant studies of 
political behavior mainly focus on electoral preferences and voting outcomes 
(Akarca and Tansel 2007; Başlevent et al. 2004, 2009; Çarkoğlu 2005, 2008, 
2012; Kalaycıoğlu 1994, 2008; Esmer, 2002, 1995)7. We expect civic engagement 
to be a significant predictor of unconventional participation as it captures 
commitment and engagement with political affairs. We do not expect civic 
engagement to be a significant determinant of conventional voting acts, since 
voting is mandatory in Turkey and should take place across all levels of 
engagement.  
 
Attitudinal determinants of participation: sophistication and values  
Civic engagement and political participation denote behavioral involvement in 
politics since they entail action. We now turn to individual-level attitudinal 
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determinants of participatory behaviors like political knowledge, efficacy, 
interest, religiosity and satisfaction with life, which have been shown to affect 
conventional and unconventional political participation in Turkey (Çarkoğlu and 
Kalaycioğlu, 2007; Kentmen-Çin, 2015). We use political sophistication and 
personal values to provide a comprehensive and parsimonious empirical model. 
Political sophistication captures several of the above factors in a multi-
dimensional concept that refers to the amount and structure of citizens’ political 
cognitions (Luskin 1987). Personal values are of particular significance because 
they function as trans-situational guides that formulate and motivate all aspects 
of political behavior, from decision-making to attitudinal responses, regardless 
of political sophistication (Goren et al. 2016).  
When citizens are politically sophisticated, their system of beliefs is large, 
wide-ranging and highly associated (Luskin 1987, 1990). High sophisticates hold 
more information and can formulate closer associations between the various 
considerations stored in their cognitive and affective memory. They are often 
more educated, and their cognitive schemas are complex, with incoming 
information passing through those cognitive routes before formulating an 
opinion. Their reasoning is internally consistent and motivated. High 
sophisticates hold higher-level political cognition and their issue preferences are 
consistent with their ideological inclinations and party identification (Rahn et al. 
1990; Krosnick 1988; Zaller 1992).  Conversely, low sophisticates (alternatively 
labeled as novices) mainly reach political decisions by relying on stored cues that 
are easily accessible and simpler (Pierce 1993; Conover and Feldman 1984). 
These individuals form issue-based preferences on the basis of their personal 
values and beliefs.  
Political sophistication is a more reliable measure of citizens’ cognitive 
engagement with politics than proxy measures that rest on its components, for 
example political knowledge, interest and education (Pierce 1993; Rivers 1988). 
Current models of political participation in Turkey do not account for citizens’ 
level of sophistication although they provide evidence about the significance of 
its components. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu (2007) show that political interest, 
knowledge and length of secular formal education are significant predictors of 
conventional participation such as voting and campaigning, and unconventional 
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participation such as petitioning, taking part in a boycott, legal demonstration or 
strike, or occupying a building or place of work (2007, 93-96). Kentmen-Çin also 
found that education has a significant effect in explaining citizens’ engagement 
with unconventional modes of participation such as signing a petition, taking 
part in boycotts, attending legal demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes and 
occupying buildings or factories (2015, 228). In line with the above, we expect 
political sophistication to be a significant predictor of conventional and 
unconventional participation in Turkey.  
 Social and political preferences, orientations and behaviors find their 
origins in personal values. Values are abstract and enduring beliefs that illustrate 
desired outcomes (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987). They form systems that provide 
organizational structure to our beliefs, and go beyond situation-specific contexts 
while their importance varies across individuals (Rokeach 1973). Values also 
have a motivational function; they can set in motion behaviors and underlie 
political decisions (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987, 1990). Values allow us to move 
from the individual to the collective level; every action (or decision for inaction) 
that results from the willingness to satisfy the motivational nature of a value has 
socio-political consequences. Interestingly, these motivational desires are in line 
with the overall value system of an individual, but they can also result in a 
conflictual existence of values within the same individual (Schwartz 1992).  
 According to Schwartz (1992, 1994) there are four high order basic 
values (openness to change, self-enhancement, self-transcendence and 
conservation) that consist of 10 subordinate values (self-direction, stimulation, 
hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence and 
universalism), which relate to the motivational goals an individual may hold. 
These general categories of values are organized on two superordinate bipolar 
dimensions: openness to change versus conservation, and self-enhancement 
versus self-transcendence (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987, 1990). Self-transcendence 
and conservation values relate to the individual position in the societal context 
belonging in the society-oriented goals, whereas self enhancement and openness 
to change values emphasize what is desired for the individual life (Schwartz 
1992) 8.  
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When we study values, we note variation across individuals and also 
within individuals, over time. That is because every individual possesses a 
number of values of varying importance (Bardi and Schwartz 2003). In addition, 
individual needs, beliefs, social attitudes and the role of values in one’s life 
change across our lifespan. Several scholars have reported that as age increases, 
individuals become more collectivist, conservative and religious (Feather 1979; 
Mishra 1994; Realo et al. 1997). The effects of values are also not constrained by 
political sophistication. Individuals use values as heuristics in making political 
choices, and novices are equally adept in using them as sophisticates. 
 In Turkey, Karakitapoğlu and Imamoğlu (2002) identified 5 significant 
value domains: self-enhancement, tradition-religiosity, universalism, 
benevolence and normative patterning. The domain of self-enhancement touches 
upon social power and status in the society along with achievement and 
hedonism. Tradition-religiosity refers to norms generated by traditions and 
religion. Universalism touches upon an interest and active concern for the 
environment nature and all people, whereas benevolence refers to harmonic 
relationships within the society. Finally normative patterning refers to 
adjustment of oneself on the basis of social expectations and socially constructed 
patterns as opposed to individual based interests (Karakitapoğlu and Imamoğlu 
2002, 340).  
 Our study applies the typology of Karakitapoğlu and Imamoğlu (2002) to 
measure systematically the effect of basic personal values on conventional and 
unconventional participation in Turkey. Preliminary evidence supports that 
values are relevant. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu (2007) show that life satisfaction 
has an inverse relationship with levels of conventional political participation. 
Kentmen-Çin (2015) finds that higher satisfaction with levels of democracy 
increase the likelihood of engaging with unconventional forms of participation. 
In addition, educational and social psychologists have examined the political 
values of university students (Basaran 1993; Hyman et al. 1958; Yahşi and Özbek 
2015; Karakitapoğlu and Imamoğlu 2002) and their life orientations (Gundogdu 
2010). Arikan (2013) examined the impact of values such as conservation, 
openness to change, self-transcendence and self-enhancement and religiosity on 
attitudes towards distribution and social policies.  
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Our hypotheses: a complex model of sophistication, values, and civic engagement 
Our model accounts for the effects of sophistication, personal values, and civic 
engagement in addition to age differences in predicting political participation. 
We expect a positive relationship between unconventional participation, civic 
engagement and political sophistication. As engagement, interest and 
understanding increase, so should unconventional participation. This 
combination of characteristics points to deliberative participation. We also 
expect higher levels of unconventional participation among younger people. We 
contrast this type of unconventional engagement with the more conventional 
voting practices. We expect that participation in the conventional sense might 
not always be motivated by strong political preferences. It might be, for example, 
part of habitual engagement particularly among older voters. We also expect that 
political participation, especially unconventional, would be more incidental and 
related to values. Because Turkey is characterized as traditionally collectivist 
(Hofstede 1997), we expect a high prominence of values related to tradition and 
religiosity as well as normative patterning in predicting conventional 
participation.  
 
Methodology 
To test the role of civic engagement, sophistication, values and age on political 
participation, we use data from the 2012 World Value Survey 6th wave. The 
survey was conducted in Turkish, by Bahçeşehir University with Principal 
Investigator Prof. Yilmaz Esmer between June 30 2012 to August 25 2012 and 
involves a national representative sample (N= 1,605). Overall our sample leans 
towards middle age (M= 38.45, SD= 14.54). For our analysis we adopted the WVS 
split of age in three groups: the young, from 18-29 years old (32% of the sample, 
nyoung =511), the middle aged, from 30–49 years old (46% of the sample, 
nmiddleaged =733) and the old, from 50 years onwards (22%, nold =361) (WVS, 
Turkey 2011, Codebook, 3-5).   
 Our measure of conventional participation includes voting behavior in 
national and local elections where participants are asked whether they vote or 
not (never, usually, never). Scale reliability for conventional participation is 
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α=.93. Our unconventional participation measure is a five-item scale capturing 
action, potential action and non-action of signing a petition, joining boycotts, 
attending peaceful demonstrations, joining strikes, any other act of protest. The 
scale reliability for unconventional political participation is α=.93. For civic 
engagement we use Inglehart and Norris’9 (2004) measure of civic activism that 
contains eleven items on membership in a number of organisations such as: 
voluntary, religious, sport or recreational, art, music or educational, 
environmental, professional, humanitarian or charitable, consumer 
organizations, self-help or mutual aid groups, labor unions, political parties or 
other groups. The reliability of our civic engagement scale is α=.72. To measure 
political sophistication we use an eleven-item scale measuring interest in politics, 
importance of politics in life, usage of sources of political information (i.e. 
newspapers, magazines, televised news, radio, email, internet, talk with friends 
and colleagues) as well as education. The scale reliability for sophistication is 
α=.81, and it ranges from 0-10 where 0 is low and 10 is high sophistication 
(mode=4.55, median= 5.38, mean=5.24). On the basis of the distribution of the 
sophistication variable, we identified two groups, high (from 5.6 to 10) and low 
sophistication (from 0 to 5.5)10.  
For values, we followed the Karakitapoğlu and Imamoğlu (2002) 
adaptation of Schwartz’s models (Tables 1 and 2), and we included the items that 
were conceptually close from the WVS: Tradition-religiosity (tradition is 
important to this person; follow the customs handed by religion and family); 
Self-enhancement (importance of being rich; living in secure surroundings; able 
to have a good time and spoil oneself; importance of being successful and be 
recognized for achievements; take risks and have an exciting life); Benevolence 
(importance of being able to do something good for the society); Normative 
patterning (importance of behaving properly and avoiding doing anything that 
might be considered as wrong by the society) and Universalism (importance of 
looking after the environment;  care for the nature and save life resources).  
***Please insert table 1 and 2 here*** 
 First we tested the relationship of each of our predictor variables with the 
two types of participation, examining parsimonious but partial models including 
age, civic engagement, sophistication or values on their own. We examined the 
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relationship between conventional and unconventional participation and age by 
testing for significantly different participation means across the three age 
groups. We explored the relationship between civic engagement and 
unconventional and conventional participation by testing for significant 
correlations between these variables. We also run mean comparisons and test 
for statistically significant differences among sophistication levels. To examine 
whether there is a link between age, sophistication, and values, we test for 
significant correlations among these variables. Finally we aim to predict 
differential impact of civic engagement, age, sophistication, value-based 
attachments, gender, age and ideological placement, on the two political 
participation types. We run regressions with conventional and unconventional 
participation as dependent variables, and the remaining variables as predictors. 
We also include gender, income and ideology as control variables. Ideological 
self-placement is measured on a 0-10 scale where 0 is left and 10 is right and 
income is measured on a 0-10 scale where 0 is the lowest step and 10 is the 
highest.  
 
Analysis and Findings  
First, we examine the role of age, and whether unconventional participation is 
more likely to occur among young people. The preliminary analysis in Table 3 
shows that age is significantly and positively associated with conventional 
participation (r=.15), and has a significant negative relationship with 
unconventional participation (r=-.21). In addition, there is no significant 
relationship between age and civic engagement (r=-.03, p=.24), showing that 
engagement is equally likely among older and younger citizens. 
Next we examined the strength of the relationship between conventional 
and unconventional participation and civic engagement to see how related the 
two concepts are in practice. The correlation between conventional participation 
and engagement is not significant (r= -.04, p= .14), but there is a positive and 
significant relationship between engagement and unconventional forms of 
participation (r=.29, p<.05). The above show that conventional and 
unconventional political participation do not share the same relationship with 
civic engagement. 
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  Turning to the relationship between sophistication, political participation 
and civic engagement, we find significant correlations across the three. 
Sophistication shares a negative significant relationship with conventional 
participation (r=-.08), but a positive significant relationship with unconventional 
participation (r=.41) and civic engagement (r=.22). As sophistication increases, 
the likelihood of engaging in conventional participation activities declines, but 
the probability of engaging with unconventional forms of participation and civic 
engagement increases.  
***Please insert Table 3 here*** 
 We then investigate further the relationship between age, sophistication 
and political participation by comparing the average scores on unconventional 
and conventional participation among our three age groups and high and low 
sophisticates. Table 4 reports the mean comparisons of the three age groups and 
levels of sophistication with statically significant differences (at p<.05) marked 
with a, b, c superscripts.  We see again that young individuals engage more with 
unconventional forms of participation in comparison to middle aged 
(Myoung=2.59, Mmiddle=1.89) and older citizens who tend to prefer formal channels 
of participation (Molder=1.28). In addition, low sophisticates score statistically 
significantly higher than high sophisticates (Mlowsoph=8.97, Mhighsoph=8.60) on 
conventional forms of participation (p<.05). In contrast, for unconventional 
participation, high sophisticates have scores statistically significantly higher than 
low sophisticates (Mhighsoph=2.94, Mlowsoph=1.13). 
***Please insert Table 4 here*** 
 Next, we turn to the relationship between personal values, age and 
sophistication. In Table 5, we present the mean comparisons on values across 
the three age groups and the two sophistication groups.  We expected that 
attachment to tradition and religiosity and normative patterning should be more 
prominent among older citizens while self-enhancement, benevolence and 
universalism should be more pronounced among the young (Basaran 1992). In 
line with Karakitapoğlu and Imamoğlu (2002), we expect the sophisticates and 
the young to favor universal over conservative values. We also expected that 
interpersonal values and collectivist concerns will matter among the less 
sophisticated, while self-enhancement and egocentric values would matter more 
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for political sophisticates, in line with Karakitapoğlu and Imamoğlu (2002) who 
find that level of education is inversely related to tradition-religiosity and 
normative patterning values orientations. 
First, we note the statistically significant difference (p<.05) on self-
enhancement scores between young and old (Myoung=6.85, Molder=6.31). Young 
individuals score significantly higher on self-enhancement compared to older 
citizens.  Middle-aged individuals also score significantly higher than old citizens 
(Mmiddle=6.65) on the self-enhancement scale. We do not find statistically 
significant differences in the other four value domains across age groups.  
***Please insert table 5 here*** 
 Turning to value scores across sophistication levels, we see 
differentiation in four of the five dimensions. Sophisticates score significantly 
higher than novices (p<.05) on self-enhancement (Mhighsoph=6.99, Mlowsoph=6.33), 
universalism (Mhighsoph=7.72, Mlowsoph=7.34) and benevolence (Mhighsoph=7.73, 
Mlowsoph=7.48) and novices score higher than sophisticates on tradition and 
religiosity (Mlowsoph=7.89, Mhiphsoph=7.64). Scores on normative patterning, 
universalism and benevolence were not statistically different between the two 
sophistication groups.   
***Please insert table 6 here*** 
 
Multinomial Analysis 
The above analyses provide a fragmented examination of the determinants of 
conventional and unconventional participation. To account for the complex 
relationship between age, civic engagement, sophistication and personal values 
we run a set of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions that predict increase or 
decrease in engaging in conventional and unconventional participation, 
controlling for ideological self-placement, income and gender. The results of the 
regressions are available in Table 7. 
***Please insert Table 7 here*** 
First, we notice that age plays a significant role in predicting conventional 
and unconventional participation but in heterogeneous ways. Age has a negative 
relationship with unconventional participation so that as age increases, engaging 
with unconventional participation actions declines; but a positive relationship 
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with conventional participation. The results pertaining to age are not surprising 
but the model we tested here shows that participation determinants can be 
complex. We also see that in the Turkish context civic engagement is a significant 
predictor of more formal forms of participation but instead increases 
involvement with unconventional forms of political participation. We think this 
is because in Turkey, where voting is mandatory and the high majority of the 
population traditionally casts their vote in electoral processes, the act of voting is 
more likely to be perceived as a ‘traditional’ civic and political responsibility one 
holds, rather than requiring particular effort or investment.  Participating, 
however in unconventional acts requires commitment across a wider range of 
political activities, many of which fall into the civic engagement bracket.  
We also see that unconventional participation is driven by complex 
combinations of values. It increases when values of traditionalism-religiosity and 
normative patterning decline (btraditionalism =-.07, bnorm.pat =-.07) and when 
benevolence and civic engagement increase (bbenevolence=.11, bciviceng =.72). 
Conventional participation scores increase as traditionalism-religiosity scores 
increase (btraditionalism=.10). This opposite effect of traditionalism/religiosity for 
conventional and unconventional participation is in line with our expectations. 
Citizens who are attached to traditional and religious norms are expected to act 
within the formal channels of participation rather than overcoming them. Those 
who do not value tradition and religion are prone to overcome the barriers of 
formal participation and engage with non-conventional forms. Normative 
patterning is also negatively related to unconventional participation. The more 
people are likely to follow socially imposed constraints, the less likely they are to 
engage with unconventional types of participation. The effect of benevolence is 
also intuitively clear: individuals that have a collective attitude towards society 
and are keen to help others are also likely to engage with unconventional forms 
of participation.  
Sophistication is also a significant and positive predictor of 
unconventional participation (bsophistication=.34) but has no significant effect on 
conventional participation. We think this is because high sophisticates are more 
likely to perceive unconventional types of participation as agents of direct 
impact on the socio-political arena. We also find that as ideology becomes more 
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left leaning, citizens are more keen to engage with unconventional channels of 
participation (bideology =-.18), but ideology has no statistically significant effect on 
conventional participation. Income patterns are similar to age: unconventional 
participation decreases as income increases (bincome=-.07) and conventional 
participation increases as income goes higher (bincome=.08). 
***Please insert Table 8 here*** 
Conclusions 
Our article uses data from the 2012 WVS to provide an empirical analysis of 
conventional and unconventional participation. We examine the effects of civic 
engagement, political sophistication, and personal values, while controlling for 
the effects of age, income and ideology. Our study puts our political psychological 
model to test in the non-western, electoral authoritarianism environment of 
Turkish politics. We find complex psychological mechanisms behind 
unconventional participation, and simpler processes operating behind 
conventional participation. Characteristically, civic engagement, often 
considered a prerequisite for political participation, is mainly relevant for 
unconventional participation. Political sophistication, accounting for citizens’ 
cognitive capacity to process political news and information, is relevant for non-
conventional politics. In addition, values function as heuristics allowing people to 
shape political decisions and positions and their role is more complex for 
unconventional participation. As we expected, conventional participation is 
explained by a simple model that accounts for values of religiosity and tradition 
and higher income.  
Our data show that in Turkey political decision making of the 
unconventional kind seems to rest on complex psychological drivers, similar to 
those that explain participation in western contexts. Political sophistication and 
civic engagement, left-leaning ideology, low income, benevolent values, and 
opposition to tradition are significant indicators of unconventional forms of 
political participation in this electoral authoritarian regime. This finding is an 
invitation to investigate this beyond our analysis of participation, taking into 
account citizens’ opinions towards political values like freedom of speech and 
individual rights, to provide an in-depth comparison between Turkey and the 
advanced democracies of the Western world.  
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Turning to the variation of the psychological mechanisms of conventional 
and unconventional behaviors, we find this finding particularly interesting. 
Conventional voting behaviors are decided on the basis of traditional 
considerations, but the engagement with unconventional acts that break the 
rigid, and perhaps often restrained, boundaries of political engagement, require 
more complex psychological engagement. Interestingly, once one accounts for 
the psychological mechanism of political decision-making, the effects of age 
become non-significant.  
Our findings allow us to profile the characteristics of the individuals likely 
to have joined the 2015 Gezi mobilizations three years after the WVS data were 
collected, or the anti-coup demonstrations in 2016 in Turkey. We conclude that 
massive public mobilizations often described as actions of ‘young passionate 
men’ can be better understood on the basis of considerations more complex and 
psychologically rich than age or gender. The application of our political 
psychological model naturally extends beyond the Turkish context, to other 
electoral authoritarian regimes. When conventional participation may seem the 
only way forward in state-repressive contexts, unconventional participation 
opens up channels for the expression of complex political engagement that is 
driven by complex psychological considerations that are worth a closer look.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes   
                                                        
1According to the survey results conducted by KONDA during the first days of 
Gezi, the average age of participants was 28 years, and approximately 80% 
where not affiliated with a political party or non-governmental organization. In 
addition, about 56% had participated in other mobilizations before Gezi whereas 
the remaining 44.4% had no past engagement. Their common denominator was 
environmental concerns opposing the AK Party’s urbanization plans for Istanbul 
(KONDA, 2014). The excessive use of force and violence by the police against 
protesters (Amnesty International, 2013) transformed public demands and 
sparked a significant response by large segments of the population (Chrona and 
Bee, forthcoming). Marches in support of Gezi were organized across Turkey 
calling for basic human rights and individual freedoms (ibid).  
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2 For a comprehensive discussion on unconventional participation and a detailed 
list of recent examples in Turkey please see Kentmen-Çin, 2015 and Çarkoğlu 
and Kalaycioğlu 2007. 
3 Voter turnout in the Turkish 2015 elections was 85.18%, which is significantly 
higher than the 42.5% in USA, 2014; 66% in the UK, 2014; 71% in Germany, 
2013; 75% in Italy, 2013; 55% in France, 2012 (International Idea, 2016).   
4 More information about the World Value Survey 6th wave in Turkey are 
available here: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp  
5 Evidence of the different participatory modalities referring to conventional and 
unconventional participation can be found in the findings of Saunders (2014), 
Dalton (2008), Norris (2002) just to name a few.   
6 According to the official reports and data files issued by the Republic of 
Turkey’s Supreme Election Council (T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2016), the voting 
percentage of the general elections in June 2015 was 85,23%, in November 2015 
was 83,92%, in June 2011 was 83.16%, in July 2007 was 84,25%, in November 
2002 was 79,14% and in April 1999 was 87.14%.  
7 Some exemptions are the quantitative analysis of the anti-war movement 
(Öntas et al. 2013), unconventional participation among women and youth 
(Sener 2015), minority participation such as Alevi and Kurds (Grigoriadis 2006); 
youth participation in South-eastern Anatolia (Özdemir 2010).  
8  Recently, Goren et al. (2016) demonstrated variation in the functional 
capability of basic personal values. Self-transcendence and conservation values 
drive attitudes on the role of government in the public life, while self-
enhancement and openness to change play a less important role in regards to 
public life (2016, 2). 
9 Inglehart and Norris use those items in their index of civic activism (2002, 249). 
We use the same items for our civic engagement scale. 
10 The distribution of our scale on political sophistication can be found in Chart 1 
in the Appendix. 
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